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1 Introduction
The revolving door from Capitol Hill to the lucrative lobbying industry has received much
criticism from the press and concerned citizens, such as the Occupy Wall Street protesters.
Public Citizen, a watchdog organization, reported that between 1998 and 2004, 43 percent
of the 198 members who left Congress and were eligible to lobby have become registered
lobbyists and concluded that urgent reforms such as extending the cooling-o¤ period are
needed to ensure government accountability (Public Citizen 2005). In fact, members of
Congress such as Rep. Bill Posey (R-FL) and Sen. Michael Bennet (D-CO) introduced bills
in 2009 (Posey) and 2010 (Bennet) that would either permanently or for ve years ban all
lobbying by ex-members of Congress.
It is well-known that the nancial appeal of lobbying is hard to resist. The First Street
Research Group analyzed lobbying disclosure data in 2011 and found that the average amount
received by ex-members of Congress per client topped $178,000 with the ex-members rep-
resenting an average of 31 clients.1 This certainly looks like politicians are being bought
by the special interests groups that spend the most to hire them. Yet, surprisingly little
work has been done in political science or economics that contributes to this issue of growing
concern for public policy. This paper is motivated by the need to bridge this gap and aims
to examine the determinants of post-congressional lobbying employment.
Specically, I relate measures of legislators characteristics, legislative behavior, and
changes in behavior to their post-congressional lobbying employment. Departing from exist-
ing studies, I compare two groups of legislators, that is, those who voluntarily retired from
1See <http://rststreetresearch.cqpress.com/rst-street-30/>.
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Congress and those who were voted out of o¢ ce. The reason for taking this selection-based
approach is that a pooled-sample regression assumes a common underlying mechanism even
though these two groups of legislators might be treated di¤erently in the job market for
lobbyists. For instance, the employers of lobbyists likely seek di¤erent qualications than
voters and would view the two groups di¤erently.
In the existing literature on congressional careers, the main focus has been on the mem-
bers retirement decision. However, relatively little attention has been paid to the study of
the revolving doors between Congress and the lobbying industry. This paper adds to previous
studies by examining the determinants of the members retirement decision in the rst stage,
but the main contribution of this paper comes from the second stage of estimation where
determinants of lobbying employment are examined taking into account the propensity to
retire voluntarily from Congress. I test multiple hypotheses, for instance, whether lobbying
employment is correlated with changes in the legislatorsvoting behavior in their last term
in o¢ ce.
Using a relatively rich dataset, a number of ndings become obvious. For instance,
voluntarily retiring from Congress is unlikely to be a determining factor for ones decision
to pursue a lobbying career. Instead, I argue that these two groups (those who voluntarily
retired and those not re-elected) are di¤erent in an unmeasured way that would a¤ect both
the probability of retiring and nding a lobbying career at the same time. That is, the
selection bias from voluntary retirement is likely to be present, and in fact I nd that the
direction of bias works in favor of those who voluntarily retire from Congress. That is, their
probability of landing a lobbying job is higher indicating that the revolving doors are more
open to ex-members who did not lose an election.
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Further, I nd that the determinants of lobbying employment exhibit systematic di¤er-
ences between the two groups in terms of estimated coe¢ cients. The main empirical ndings
are that the legislators who become lobbyists after losing an election tend to have more con-
servative voting records relative to the median voter in Congress, and they also have served
on a major committee(s) compared to those who do not become lobbyists. However, these
e¤ects are largely absent for those who voluntarily retire from Congress. For this group,
the length of congressional tenure and a decrease in conservative voting score as well as a
slowdown of legislative activities such as bill sponsorship in their last term are important
predictors of lobbying.
These ndings suggest that there might be two kinds of revolving doors between Congress
and the lobbying industry. That is, those who are electorally weak (did not get re-elected)
need to serve on an important committee(s) and be relatively conservative to be attractive
to the mostly conservative, corporate lobbying clients. On the other hand, those who volun-
tarily retire have less commitment to their constituency, so there seems to be some degree
of shirking in terms of deviations from past voting records and the number of bills that they
introduced during their last term. Because members can time their retirement, their con-
gressional tenure rather than specic knowledge gained from serving on committees seems
to matter the most.
I also compare and contrast two competing (or complementary) hypotheses regarding the
ideology of former legislators who become lobbyists. One is that lobbying rms tend to hire
ideologically moderate members of Congress who can inuence the median voter. The other
is that the demand for conservative lobbyists outweighs that for liberal lobbyists. It turns
out that the data t the latter hypothesis better than the former. Further, in contrast to
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what the rst hypothesis predicts, there is evidence that the retiring members who become
lobbyists tend to deviate from their past voting records in their last term away from the
congressional median. That is, rather than moderating, they tend to take ideologically more
extreme voting positions.
The outline for this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section
3 briey reviews the ethics rule in Congress. Section 4 lays out the hypotheses and empirical
methods. Section 5 describes the dataset, and Section 6 contains the main results. Section
7 presents concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
The literature on congressional careers has a long history in political science, where a number
of authors have focused on the determinants of the members decision to run for re-election
or retire from Congress (e.g., Kiewiet and Zeng 1993; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Hall and
van Houweling 1995). Economists have recently contributed to this literature by investigating
the post-congressional careers of those who left Congress. For instance, Diermeier et al.
(2005) estimated a dynamic structural model of post-congressional wages of former members
of Congress and showed that congressional experience increases the members post-congress
wage in the private sector. This paper contributes to this literature by investigating what
determines, specically, the lobbying employment of former Representatives, and how it
di¤ers based on whether they lost their re-election bids.2
2There are a couple of recent studies that look at the value of political connections to incumbent politicians
from the standpoint of lobbyists (see, e.g., Blanes i Vidal et al. 2010; and Bertrand et al. 2011). The
di¤erence is that this paper focuses on the Congress-to-lobbying revolving door, whereas these two papers
do not distinguish between the professional lobbyists and congressmen-turned-lobbyists. For the industry-
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More closely related is the political science literature on the U.S. Congress. Earlier
works in this literature are based on survey interviews. For instance, Milbrath (1963),
based on a 1956 sample of 114 registered lobbyists, found that a working knowledge of the
subject matter was the most important factor looked for in recruiting lobbyists.3 Similarly,
Salisbury et al. (1989), based on a 1983 sample of 776 Washington lobbyists, found that
government experience was valuable in terms both of substantive knowledge gained of process
and familiarity with policy issues, rather than through contacts made from government
experience. This is consistent with the ndings in this paper in that committee assignments
are important but cosponsorship networks are not. The novel part is that this relationship
holds only for those who were voted out and not for those who chose to retire.
Because these studies are based on a survey of current lobbyists, they do not include the
career choices of all eligible former legislators. That is, the surveys typically do not include
former members who did not become lobbyists. Hence, it is di¢ cult to draw implications from
these studies on who is more likely to become a lobbyist and what legislative characteristics
are correlated with post-congressional lobbying employment. Herrick and Nixon (1996) is
the rst empirical study to trace the memberspost-congressional careers. Herrick and Nixon
surveyed a subset of House members who retired between 1971 and 1992 and found that,
among other factors, age can limit the opportunities for post-congressional employment, and
while voted-out members tend to remain politically active those who retired voluntarily are
less likely to work in the political arena.4
to-Cabinet revolving door, see also Gely and Zardkoohi (2001).
3Zeigler and Baer (1968) performed another study based on a 1966 survey of legislators and lobbyists in
four U.S. states. Their primary focus was on the examination of the backgrounds of legislators and lobbyists,
where they found that legislators and lobbyists share important backgrounds such as income, education, and
occupation.
4Herrick and Nixons nding that political employees were more likely to have been forced out of o¢ ce does
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However, although Herrick and Nixon (1996) argued that members behave in such a
way as to increase their marketability after they leave Congress, they relied on more direct
measures of the politiciansinterests and did not include variables such as voting records.
Further, their classication of political employees includes both lobbyists and other govern-
ment employees, thus the implications for Congress-to-lobbying revolving doors cannot be
clearly drawn. Using a partial list of samples collected by Borders and Dockery (1995), Leal
(2002) examined the former membersdecisions on whether to live and/or become lobbyists
in Washington after leaving Congress. Leal found that longer-serving members were more
likely to work as lobbyists, whereas age and ideological distance from constituent preferences
were negatively associated with lobbying employment.5
This paper is closest to the paper by Butler and Sovey (2010). Following the former
members of the U.S. House of the 104th109th Congresses, Butler and Sovey showed that
leadership positions, committee assignments, and ideological moderation were important
factors for the memberspost-congressional lobbying employment. In particular, they ad-
dressed the endogeneity of a legislators ideological location by using the ideology of the
legislators district as an instrumental variable. The empirical methodology used in this
paper as well as the main hypothesis regarding how a legislators ideology correlates with
lobbying employment is substantially di¤erent from theirs. For instance, this paper estimates
a sample selection model using term-limit pledges as an instrument for retirement decisions
not hold in this paper. One possible reason is that their sample selection could be biased, which they mention
in their paper as well. That is, Herrick and Nixon relied on addresses in the directory of the Association
of Former Members of Congress, which about 60 percent of former members belong. Importantly, members
who opted to retire were much more likely to join the association than members who lost re-election bids or
sought higher o¢ ce.
5In this paper, the e¤ect of tenure is positive only for the retiring group and not for the voted-out group.
As Herrick and Nixon pointed out, Borders and Dockerys sample is not a random sample; it is based on
anecdotes and case studies, which also su¤er from selection or survivorship bias.
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and focuses on ideological conservatism not moderation as the main driver.
Finally, there is a strand of the literature that examines the last-term behavior of
revolving-door regulators. This literature found largely mixed results. For instance, using the
voting records of the Federal Communications Commission Commissioners, Gormley (1979)
showed that the Commissioners who worked for broadcasting companies tended to vote in
support of the broadcasting industry, but the e¤ect was small once other measures were put
into place to control for their political a¢ liation. On the other hand, Cohen (1986) found
that the Commissioners employed by the broadcast industry in fact were less supportive
of the broadcast industry. However, Cohen found some evidence that those Commissioners
increased their support for the broadcast industry during their last term in o¢ ce. This paper
complements these ndings by studying the e¤ect of revolving doors on legislatorsbehavior.
3 Ethics Rules
Federal conict-of-interest law (18 U.S.C. § 201) prohibits any public o¢ cial from accepting
anything of value in return for being induced to do or omit to do any o¢ cial act. The
House and the Senate as well as the executive branch have their own ethics regulations, so
that members of Congress and government agencies do not cross this line. The most sig-
nicant revision to the post-congressional restrictions was the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,
which allowed former Representatives to accept a lobbying position immediately after leav-
ing Congress but prohibited them from making direct lobbying contacts with their former
colleagues for one year after leaving Congress.
However, these restrictions are poorly enforced because of a series of sidesteps, exceptions,
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and evasions. For instance, the cooling-o¤period applies only to making a direct contact. As
a result, former public o¢ cials can simply ask other lobbyists to make the contact and act
as supervisors for the lobbying campaign. Negotiation of future employment while in o¢ ce
is also common despite the potential conict of interest. Although the ethics rule suggests
recusal from o¢ cial business where a conict of interest occurs, internal monitoring activity
is rarely observed unless some scandal is uncovered. Moreover, the House rules are more lax
than the Senate rules.
With the advent of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and the Technical Amendments
Act of 1998, which imposed and claried lobbyist registration and reporting requirements,
it became easier to produce a reliable list of former members of Congress who became
lobbyists. One issue is that the initial compliance to the disclosure law was arguably low
until the 1998 Technical Amendment Act became law. Because incorrect classications can
dilute the results, I did not include the 104th Congress (19951996) in the sample. Overall,
the institutional background seems to support the research design that correlates members
legislative activity and their lobbying employment.
4 Empirical Framework
The basic regression equation is a probit model in which the dependent variable is an indi-
cator variable for post-congressional lobbying employment, which estimates the conditional
probability of a member becoming a lobbyist upon leaving Congress. As mentioned before,
one concern is that there could be a sample selection problem if, say, members with above
average abilities tend to retire voluntarily whereas those with below average abilities tend to
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lose their re-election bids. That is, electorally secure legislators tend to have longer political
careers and reach their retirement age while in o¢ ce. Hence, they may be able to choose to
retire only when lobbying job o¤ers are forthcoming or the prospect of future employment
looks strong.
On the other hand, members who are electorally insecure face low re-election probabilities,
and when they are voted out they have the additional weight of having lost. Thus, only
the ones with very attractive proles may be able to secure post-congressional lobbying
employment. For instance, they may have to sell their experience or expert knowledge
gained from serving on a powerful committee(s), and to the extent that lobbying rms tend
to serve mostly corporate clients they may also need to show a conservative identication to
appear attractive to their potential employers. On the other hand, it is not straightforward
whether electorally insecure members would change their voting behavior simply assuming
that they will not be re-elected.
Heckman (1979) rst proposed that this type of selection bias can be corrected for by
using a two-step procedure. Further, using doubly truncated means, Heckmans original
selection model has been adapted to correct for the selection bias in running separate re-
gressions based on subgroup categories (see, e.g., Idson and Feaster 1990). This literature
suggests that, in the rst stage, a probit model of retirement decision is estimated, and
truncated means for each individual are computed.6 In the second stage, regressions are
run for each subgroup including the truncated means as an additional regressor in order to
provide selection-corrected estimates of the e¤ects of explanatory variables on the likelihood
6That is, i = (Xb)=(Xb) for the retirement group and i =  (Xb)=(1   (Xb)) for the voted-out
group.
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of landing a lobbying job.
I argue that a members term-limit pledge can be used as an instrument for retirement
decisions in the rst-stage estimation. Although there is no mandatory limit on the number
of terms that members of Congress can serve, several congressional candidates pledged to
self-limit their own terms if elected to Congress, and some of these informal pledges started
to be binding from year 2000. Ultimately, some members kept their promise and stepped
down, whereas others broke their pledge and sought re-election. Given the amount of public
pressure and campaigning against the pledge breakers, the term-limit pledge is no doubt
an important factor in leaving Congress without seeking re-election. On the other hand,
it seems less likely that the term-limit pledge a candidate made prior to getting elected is
correlated with the lobbying employment conditional upon leaving Congress in the future.7
In the second-stage estimation of lobbying employment outcome, the main hypotheses is
that, holding other factors constant, ideologically more conservative members are more likely
to become lobbyists. This is because the vast majority of lobbying expenditures come from
corporate clients. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, lobbying expenditures
by trade unions collectively comprised only 1.4 percent of total spending in 2005. Even if
we include ideological, single-issue lobbying in this category, this proportion remains only
at 7.8 percent. This does not mean that some center-leftists cannot lobby on behalf of
unions, but those organizations tend to pay much less than what big companies spend to
hire top lobbyists.8 So long as ex-members respond to nancial incentives, the general
7That is, given that many congressional hopefuls made term-limit pledges to increase their chance of
winning, it is not necessarily the case that those candidates who want to serve longer in Congress would
decline to make such pledges (e.g., they can break their pledges later on).
8Some of the top lobbyists from the Democratic Party, such as Sen. John Breaux (D-LA), Rep. Thomas
Downey (D-NY), Rep. Victor Fazio (D-CA), and Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-MO), who used to represent
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trend is predicted to be a positive association between conservative voting and lobbying
employment.
Another possibility, as suggested by Butler and Sovey (2010), is that lobbying rms
may try to hire moderate party members who can inuence the median voter on the oor.
Butler and Sovey argue that the access theory or the informational lobbying hypothesis (e.g.,
Austen-Smith 1995) suggests that former members who are similar to sitting legislators have
the best chance to inuence them and thus can help a bill pass on the oor. If this is true,
then the lobbying rms would want to hire ideologically moderate members of Congress
from either party. These two hypotheses, operationalized by location and distance from the
median score in Congress, may be viewed as complementary rather than alternatives to each
other. Ultimately, which of these two forces is stronger seems to be an empirical question.
There are a number of other explanations for the revolving-door lobbyists. One hypoth-
esis is that the lobbying industry hires those who possess human capital in the form of
personal networks and legislative expertise. As Salisbury et al. (1989) suggest, the good-
old-boy network suggests that lobbying success depends heavily upon personal contacts and
maintaining personal relationships with o¢ cials, so that when asked to do things for the
benet of the lobbyists clients they will be inclined to respond favorably. The question is
then how to measure such personal networks. Complete and reliable data on a truly personal
network seem to be unknown in the literature and indeed would be di¢ cult to obtain.
However, if a personal network is formed in Congress based on the give and take of
legislative support, bill co-sponsorship data could provide a good proxy for such relationships.
That is, to the extent that co-sponsoring others bills can be considered as doing them
the working class, now represent Americas largest companies as lobbyists.
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favors, a members outward co-sponsorship can represent how well that members reciprocal
requests would be received by former colleagues. Thus, outward co-sponsorship measures
are expected to be positively correlated with lobbying. Similarly, a members inward co-
sponsorship indicates the amount of support that the member received from colleagues and
thus could measure the members informal leadership, which is also expected to be positively
correlated with lobbying.
In a similar account, members who are elected to a formal leadership position or appointed
as a member of powerful committees may have more inuence on other members as well as set
the future agenda for Congress or congressional committees. The experience and expertise
of such members could make them attractive to potential employers and thus is expected
to be positively correlated with lobbying. Party leadership and committees serve di¤erent
functions, but here the purpose is to use them as a proxy to identify those who are in a more
inuential position than those who are not. If dummy variables are used for each committee
and leadership position separately, then the estimation would not be reliable due to the small
number of such cases.
On the other hand, the number of terms served in Congress represents a form of general
human capital. That is, the more terms a legislator serves in Congress, the more knowledge-
able that member becomes about the legislative or political process in general. As long as
the lobbying rms value such broad experience and insights, the length of tenure in Congress
would be positively correlated with lobbying employment. Members may also try to signal
their productivity to potential employers by introducing more pieces of legislation. However,
it is probably not so much the quantity of proposed legislation but the content of legislation
that matters; thus, it is unclear how the number of bills sponsored would be correlated with
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lobbying employment.
As Herrick and Nixon (1996) hypothesized, legislators who desire a post-congressional
lobbying career may also change their behavior in their last term to increase their appeal to
potential employers. Hence, I include changes in the membersvoting records, bill sponsor-
ship activity, and co-sponsorship counts in their last terms compared to their second-to-last
terms in o¢ ce. This would provide evidence on whether and how members are likely to
change their behavior to increase their marketability. However, such opportunistic behavior
is not so straightforward for those who would like to hold on to their seat rst and fore-
most because vulnerable members are particularly unlikely to change their voting behavior
to please their constituents.
Finally, I control for the membersages. Some older members may retire and choose not
to work, whereas others may retire to take a high paying job before permanent retirement.
Thus, the direction of the association is uncertain. On the other hand, members from
Maryland might be more willing to work as a lobbyist than a member from California, so
I control for the ight time from a members home to Washington, DC. I also include a
Republican dummy because the Republican party won all the elections during the sample
period, and the lobbying rms may have more demand for majority party members. Further,
the K Street Project pressured lobbying rms to hire Republicans, so there may be a direct,
level e¤ect of party a¢ liation.9
Another, yet implausible possibility is that retiring members do not plan ahead their
9The K Street Project was launched shortly after the 1994 elections by Republican leaders such as Tom
DeLay and GOP advisors such as Grover Norquist. The campaign was to place Republican a¢ liates in
high level corporate and industry lobbyist jobs and oust Democrats. Republican leaders held meetings
with business executives and lobbyists to pressure them and vetted the hiring decisions of major lobbyists
(VandeHei and Eilperin 2003). The project started to wane in 2004.
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career choices after serving. If this is the case, then former legislators only think about
pursuing a lobbying career after retiring, so their legislative behavior would not be a¤ected
by the prospect of lobbying employment. To show that retirement itself is not responsible
for the lobbying employment, I start with a basic, pooled-sample regression assuming the
usual conditional independence as well as the linear mean function, where the only source of
omitted variables is the set of observed covariates. As a robustness check, I also estimate the
average treatment e¤ect of voluntary retirement using a propensity score matching estimator
with caliper restrictions. The main advantage of matching is that it allows for heterogeneous
e¤ects and avoids potential misspecication of conditional mean function.
In order to quantify separate contributions of group di¤erences in measured character-
istics and estimated coe¢ cients at the end, I apply a nonlinear decomposition technique
commonly attributed to Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).10 That is, the observed di¤er-
ences in predicted probabilities between the two groups can be divided into variations that
are attributable to di¤erences in the characteristics of the members (the endowments ef-
fects), di¤erences in the treatment of these characteristics (the coe¢ cients e¤ects), and
an unexplained portion of the di¤erential. This can answer the question of whether potential
employers have di¤erent evaluation criteria or naturally discriminate when they are looking
to hire former Congressmen.
10Intuitively, if the probit index from the two groups are XAbA and XBbB , then the di¤erence in the two
groupsmeans can be decomposed as XAb^A   XB b^B = ( XA   XB)b^B + XB(b^A   b^B) plus an unexplained
residual term, where the rst term represents the expected change in Group Bs mean outcome if Group
B had Group As predictor levels, and the second term measures the expected change in Group Bs mean
outcome if Group B had Group As coe¢ cients. See, e.g., Jann (2008) for more details on implementation.
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5 Dataset
The data set consists of 135 former members of the U.S. House of Representatives for the
105th108th Congresses (19972004) who were eligible to lobby, where eligible members
excludes those who became a Senator or took a job in the executive branch within the rst
three years after leaving Congress. Additionally, the sample does not include those, based
on bibliographic research, who left Congress due to serious illness, convictions, or criminal
charges because their opportunity to pursue a lobbying career is severely limited, and those
who did not serve out a full term or switched their party a¢ liation during their last term
because key explanatory variables are unavailable.11
Voluntary retirement is dened as exiting from Congress without running for re-election,
the Senate, or a governorship. This divides the sample into 64 voluntary and 71 involuntary
exits. For each observation, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the
member started working for a lobbying rm or any other organization that is primarily
engaged in lobbying within the rst three years of departure from Congress. Three years
seem to be the upper threshold for most lobbying employment. As a result, two members
who started lobbying after ve years and one after seven years of leaving Congress were not
considered as passing through the revolving doors.
The data set contains the members personal characteristics and legislative activities
during their last term in o¢ ce. These are the membersvoting records as measured by the
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)s scores, legislative productivity as proxied by the
11The Center for Responsive Politics has compiled a comprehensive directory of lobbyists, which is current
as of September 2006 and includes registered lobbyists under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. I supplemented
this source with my own bibliographic research on the membersretirement and post-congressional careers.
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number of bills introduced, legislative networks as identied by both inward and outward
co-sponsorship, and an indicator of whether the member served on important committees
and/or party leadership. Other variables in the dataset include the members age at exit,
term-limit pledge that is due at the time of exit, the number of terms served in Congress, a
Republican dummy, and dummy variables for each Congress.
For each member, their ADA scores over the two sessions of their last term in Congress
are averaged and time adjusted.12 I then constructed two measures of each members voting
records relative to the congressional median. First, the ideological location of each member
was calculated by subtracting each members ADA score from the median. Thus, a higher
score in terms of location means a more conservative voting record relative to the median.
Second, the absolute distance between a members ADA score and the congressional median
was calculated. Here, the larger the distance, the more ideologically extreme the members
voting record relative to the median.
The ADA scores are not a perfect measure of a legislators ideology, but they have been
extensively used in the literature as a proxy. For instance, ADA scores have been shown to
measure business versus labor interests (Grier 1991), as well as producer protection versus
consumerism (Weingast and Moran 1983). Because the location and the distance from the
median are the same for Republican party members and only di¤er by the sign for Democratic
party members, there is a hidden collinearity problem when these two variables are used at
the same time. Thus, in the following analysis, I use these two voting scores one at a time,
12For comparability across time, I adjusted the ADA scores following the method proposed by Groseclose
et al. (1999). This basically standardizes the scores by using estimates of the mean and the dispersion to
make them comparable across time. Here, Andersons (2009) updated estimates were used for the shift and
stretch parameters.
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so that the collinearity problem does not arise.
There is no established method of how to measure a legislators good-old-boy network.
However, some recent studies used a members co-sponsorship network as a proxy to measure
how well connected a legislator is (e.g., Fowler 2006). In that literature, a few measures have
been proposed. For instance, for each inward and outward co-sponsorship, the number of
unique legislators who co-sponsored a bill measures the centrality of the sponsoring legislator
in the network, and the number of co-sponsor signatures takes into account the frequency of
such ties. In this paper, I use a weighted measure that discounts the number of signatures
by the number of co-sponsors.13
The powerful committees dened in this paper are the Appropriations Committee, the
Ways and Means Committee, and the Energy and Commerce Committee. The Rules Com-
mittee is sometimes thought to be an important committee as well, but the aforementioned
three committees form a distinct top-three group in terms of the total number of revolving
door personnel including former sta¤ers, identied to date by the Center for Responsive
Politics, and this denition has been used in the literature (e.g., Milyo and Groseclose 1999).
As mentioned above, I include the Speaker and the Majority and Minority leaders in this
category because they too hold inuential positions.
Table 1 provides summary statistics. On average, a departing member served six terms in
Congress, introduced 17 bills in the last term, and is 57-years old. Four out of 10 members
served on powerful committees, and the sample consists of roughly equal proportions of
Republicans and Democrats. Overall, 45 percent of the 135 former Representatives in the
13The qualitative results in this paper remain unchanged if unique or total co-sponsorship measures
are used instead of the weighted measure. Co-sponsorship data were obtained from James H. Fowler
<http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/cosponsorship.htm>.
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sample stepped into a lobbying career. A comparison of the means shows that the voluntary
retirement group has a 53 percent rate of pursuing a lobbying career, whereas the voted-out
group has a 38 percent rate. This di¤erence is marginally signicant. That is, those who
choose to retire seem to have a higher unconditional probability of lobbying than those who
lose re-election.
The explanatory variables are grouped into three categories, that is, those describing
the legislators characteristics, their legislative behavior in the last term, and changes in
legislative behavior compared to the previous term. That is, the variables in the third
category measure the di¤erences between the legislators last and the second-to-last term in
Congress. There are some statistically signicant di¤erences between the characteristics of
the two groups. For instance, those who voluntarily retire tend to be older and have served
more terms on average than those who are voted out. The term-limit pledge variable shows
that the proportion of those who self-imposed a term limit is higher for the retirement group
than for the voted-out group.
6 Results
In this section, I report the estimation results based on two sets of covariates. In both speci-
cations, the covariates are grouped into the three components (i.e., legislator characteristics;
legislative behavior; and changes in legislative behavior). The di¤erence is that in Tables
2 and 4, I use the members ideological location to test the hypothesis that lobbying rms
demand relatively more conservative members to serve the need of mostly corporate clients.
In Tables 3 and 5, I use the distance from the median, instead of the location, to compare the
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model t as well as to test the hypothesis that lobbying rms value ideologically moderate
members of the Congress whose preferences are similar to the median voter (Austen-Smith
1995).
Column (1) of Table 2 reports pooled prot estimates, which assumes that selection due
to unobservable factors is not relevant and also that the two groups are homogenous. The
retirement dummy is marginally signicant at the 10 percent level. The signs of other signif-
icant coe¢ cients appear consistent with the hypotheses. For instance, powerful committee
assignment, the number of terms served, and conservative voting records (relative to the
median) are all signicant and positively correlated with lobbying employment, whereas age
and the Republican dummy are negatively associated with it. Further, a change in the last
term towards more conservative voting is negatively associated with lobbying.
The next three columns estimate the treatment e¤ects of voluntary retirement on lobbying
employment. This can answer the question of whether retirement is responsible for lobbying,
which in other words would mean that lobbying was not planned before retirement. To do so,
column (2) estimates a propensity score based on all covariates and predicts the probability
of voluntary retirement. Column (2) shows that an older age and a decrease in the number
of bills sponsored mainly predict a members retirement decision at the conventional level.
There is su¢ cient overlap in the distributions of the estimated propensity scores between
the two groups, so the matching on estimated linear propensity scores performs well (Rubin
and Thomas 1996)
Columns (3) and (4) show matching estimates of the retirement e¤ect with di¤erent
tolerance levels. In column (3), with a tighter caliper bound, the treatment e¤ect of voluntary
retirement drops approximately 18 percent, and the coe¢ cient is no longer signicant at
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the 10 percent level. In column (4), when the caliper bound is relaxed, the retirement
coe¢ cient decreases even further. This suggests that lobbying employment is unlikely to
be an afterthought of the retirees because the probability of lobbying is not signicantly
higher for those who voluntarily retire. However, this argument is not conclusive because
the conditional independence assumption to identify a treatment e¤ect is often implausible,
and many of the covariates are not known.
Table 3 presents the analogous results using the distance, instead of the location, from the
congressional median. In column (1), more ideologically moderate members seem marginally
more likely to lobby, but the moderation in voting in the last term relative to the second-
to-last term is not correlated with lobbying. In column (2), in predicting the probability
of retirement, the di¤erence is that the Republican dummy and a movement away from
the congressional median are additionally associated with voluntary retirement. In terms of
treatment e¤ect, similar to the previous results, both estimates in columns (3) and (4) are
not statistically signicant, which suggests that based on observable covariates retirement is
not a trigger for lobbying.
The analysis thus far suggests that such factors as committee assignment, experience,
age, and conservative voting generally seem to matter the most. One pitfall, however, is
that the above analysis ignores selection on unobservables, and by assumption it treats the
two groups of legislators in the same way. Uncovering the selection bias and discerning the
di¤erence between the two groups can shed light on policy implications, to which we turn
below. As explained above, the identication is helped by the inclusion of the term-limit-
pledge variable, which is excluded from the outcome equation.
Table 4 shows the estimates of the selection model by legislator group. Column (1) reports
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the estimates of the rst-stage probit equation for retirement decision. The coe¢ cient on the
term-limit-pledge variable is signicant and positive, which suggests that public pressure and
a campaign against pledge breakers were indeed important factors for those legislators to keep
their promises. Other signicant variables for predicting retirement include age and tenure.
It also appears that departing members sponsored a larger number of bills but received less
co-sponsorship support in their last term. The signs of these coe¢ cients are consistent with
those in column (2) of Table 2; however, the coe¢ cients are now more precisely estimated.
Columns (2) and (3) of Tables 4 report the main regression results, where the selection
bias due to unobservable factors is corrected for by including truncated means calculated
from the rst-stage probit equation reported in column (1). Because the truncated means
are positive (negative) for the retirees (election losers), the statistically signicant, posi-
tive coe¢ cient on the selection term in column (2) means a signicantly higher predicted
probability of lobbying for the retirement group. This contrasts with the previous results
when only observable covariates were considered. On the other hand, the selection term for
the voted-out group is statistically insignicant implying that losing (re)election does not
decrease lobbying employment.
The estimation results in columns (2) and (3) tell us that the underlying relationship
between the covariates and lobbying employment di¤ers signicantly depending on whether
a legislator voluntarily retired or was voted out. That is, for the retirees, the length of
congressional tenure and a decrease in conservative voting scores in the last term increase
the probability of lobbying at the 1 percent level, followed by a decrease in the number of
bills sponsored at the 5 percent level. In contrast, for those who were voted out, important
committee assignment and conservative voting scores are positively correlated, and the Re-
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publican dummy negatively associated with lobbying at the 1 percent level, followed by the
ight time to Washington, DC.
These two sets of signicant predictors are mutually exclusive. Election losers seem
to need an attractive prole demonstrated by membership of a powerful committee(s) and
conservative voting scores. In this group of legislators, a Republican party member is in
fact less likely to become a lobbyist, holding other factors constant, implying that despite
the K Street Project the labor market for lobbyists did not necessarily confer advantages to
Republican members. Further, none of the co-sponsorship network variables seems to matter
for this group of legislators. In summary, lobbying rms seem to value expert knowledge
gained from serving on the powerful committee(s) and conservative voting records when a
legislator is voted out of o¢ ce.
On the other hand, specic knowledge and ideological positions do not seem to play an
important role for retiring members. Instead, employers seem to value general knowledge
and experience as proxied by the length congressional tenure. Looking at column (2), for this
group of legislators, there is some evidence that they engage in legislative shirking in their
last term in o¢ ce. That is, a movement towards less conservative voting as well as a decrease
in the number of bills sponsored in their last term in o¢ ce predict a higher probability of
lobbying employment after serving. This is consistent with the idea that those who did not
face re-election pressure have more freedom to change their voting behavior and slow down
legislative productivity.
As Butler and Sovey (2010) elaborated, another possibility is that moderate members
of Congress are more valuable to lobbying rms. Butler and Sovey compared members
with moderate and extreme voting records, and found that moderate members are more
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likely to become lobbyists after leaving Congress (where this result was only marginally
signicant with a p-value near 0.10). Despite a number of di¤erences in their specications
and those in this paper, I test their basic hypothesis by using the ideological distance from
the congressional median and present the estimation results in Table 5.
In column (3) of Table 5, for the voted-out group, there is some evidence that ideologically
moderate members are more likely to become lobbyists (which is also only marginally signi-
cant) because the coe¢ cient on the distance measure is negative. On the other hand, column
(2) in this table shows that for the retirement group an increase rather than a decrease in the
measured distance from the median in the last term is positively associated with lobbying at
the 1 percent level, whereas the rest of the coe¢ cient estimates are generally consistent with
those in Table 4. Further, the model t of the outcome equation, as measured by pseudo
R2, is lower with the distance than with the location variable. Therefore, the data seem to
prefer the former hypothesis.
The main results in Table 4 can be interpreted as follows. In the literature on lobby-
ing campaigns targets, some authors nd that interest groups tend to lobby mainly their
legislative allies (e.g., Bauer et al. 1963; Milbrath 1963), whereas others argue that inter-
est groups may target opposing, undecided members of Congress (e.g., Austen-Smith and
Wright 1994). Similarly, the reason why having a more conservative voting record predicts a
future in lobbying may be that among those who generally support conservative, corporate
interests (i.e., Republicans), lobbying rms may look for someone with a strong ideological
commitment who can lead and expand their agenda, whereas lobbying rms may want to
hire moderates from those in the opposite spectrum (i.e., Democrats) who can cooperate
with them and persuade the median voter in Congress.
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Another robust nding is that the legislative activities measured by bill sponsorship
and co-sponsorship are not signicant predictors of lobbying employment, although for the
retirement group those who become lobbyists tend to signicantly reduce the number of bills
they sponsor in their last term. This suggests that those who pass through the revolving
doors tend not to be the most productive members or possess a strong network with other
members. This may be because these covariates are indeed unimportant for Representative-
turned-lobbyists. This is in fact consistent with ndings by Milbrath (1963) and Salisbury
et al. (1989). Based on surveys of Washington lobbyists, these authors showed that a
knowledge of subject matters and legislative processes were more often deemed important
than who was known in the legislative and executive branches.
Finally, I formally test the signicance of the di¤erence between both groups of legislators.
Table 6 shows the decomposition of the probability di¤erential attributable to di¤erences in
characteristics and estimated coe¢ cients for the specications considered in Tables 4 and
5. The respective contribution of the three explanatory variable groups to the likelihood
of lobbying are reported. The selection term is not included here because of di¢ culty in
interpreting. The rst row of each subpanel shows that overall only the coe¢ cients e¤ect (i.e.,
di¤erences in estimated coe¢ cients) is statistically signicant. This implies that di¤erent
evaluations of former members of Congress by potential employers is the main reason for
the above empirical ndings rather than the di¤erences in the observed characteristics or
behavior of those legislators.
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7 Conclusion
The fact that some members of Congress seem to care about lucrative careers as lobbyists
after serving is of critical public policy concern. This paper lays out some basic empirical
connections between post-congressional lobbying employment and legislative activities as
well as legislator characteristics. The model took into account the nonrandom selection
issue and allowed for di¤erent underlying structure for voted-out and retiring members of
Congress. I found that there is a strong selection bias that works in favor of the retiring
members of Congress, suggesting that re-election pressure is not e¤ective in restraining their
behavior.
The main empirical ndings are that for those who were voted out the Congress-to-
lobbying revolving door is associated with powerful committee assignments and conservative
voting records. For those who voluntarily retired, however, these mechanisms are largely
absent. Instead, congressional tenure and a movement towards less conservative voting are
associated with lobbying employment. One limitation of this paper is that the qualitative
nature of those behavioral changes is not examined. Future research might investigate the
substantive nature of bills sponsored and voted for or against by the revolving-door legisla-
tors.
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Table. 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Mean values are reported with standard deviations in the parentheses. In the last column,
p-values are from two-tailed tests.
a For changes in legislative behavior, the sample size of the voted-out group is smaller because
ten Representatives served only one term.
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Table. 2: PROBIT AND MATCHING MODELS I
Columns (1) and (2) report marginal e¤ects at the mean, where the dependent variable is
one for lobbying and retirement, respectively. Standard errors are in the parentheses, and
likelihood ratio tests are reported. Columns (3) and (4) report the average treatment e¤ect
on the treated, where the outcome variable is one for lobbying, and bootstrapped standard
errors are reported.
*** Signicant at 1 percent, ** Signicant at 5 percent, * Signicant at 10 percent.
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Table. 3: PROBIT AND MATCHING MODELS II
Columns (1) and (2) report marginal e¤ects at the mean, where the dependent variable is
one for lobbying and retirement, respectively. Standard errors are in the parentheses, and
likelihood ratio tests are reported. Columns (3) and (4) report the average treatment e¤ect
on the treated, where the outcome variable is one for lobbying, and bootstrapped standard
errors are reported.
*** Signicant at 1 percent, ** Signicant at 5 percent, * Signicant at 10 percent.
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Table. 4: SELECTION MODEL BY GROUP I
Column (1) reports marginal e¤ects at the mean, where the dependent variable is one for
retirement. Columns (2) and (3) report marginal e¤ects at the mean, where the dependent
variable is one for lobbying. Standard errors are in the parentheses, and likelihood ratio tests
are reported.
***Signicant at 1 percent, ** Signicant at 5 percent, * Signicant at 10 percent.
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Table. 5: SELECTION MODEL BY GROUP II
Column (1) reports marginal e¤ects at the mean, where the dependent variable is one for
retirement. Columns (2) and (3) report marginal e¤ects at the mean, where the dependent
variable is one for lobbying. Standard errors are in the parentheses, and likelihood ratio tests
are reported.
***Signicant at 1 percent, ** Signicant at 5 percent, * Signicant at 10 percent.
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Table. 6: DECOMPOSITION OF PROBABILITY DIFFERENTIAL
Each e¤ect is evaluated at the mean. The reference group is the retirement group, so that
a minus sign indicates a lower probability of becoming a lobbyist for the voted-out group.
Each panel decomposes probit index based on the results shown in Tables 4 and 5. Standard
errors are in the parentheses.
***Signicant at 1 percent, ** Signicant at 5 percent, * Signicant at 10 percent.
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